Intelligent machines as social catalysts by Rahwan, Iyad et al.
COMMENTARY
Intelligent machines as social catalysts
Iyad Rahwana,1, Jacob W. Crandallb,1, and Jean-François Bonnefonc,1
Some people excel at facilitating communication be-
tween other people. They are social catalysts: they
promote engagement within a team, keep the team on
point, defuse hostility, make sure that everyone con-
tributes to the best of their capacity, and generally
ensure that the team performs better than the sum of its
members. Social catalysts need to be subtly aware of
social dynamics, mood changes, face-saving strategies,
and unspoken rules of communication. Given these
requirements, it would seem that being a social cata-
lyst is a quintessentially human role. The research of
Traeger et al. (1), however, opens perspectives about
the possibility of having machines rather than people
perform the role of social catalysts in human groups.
Before we can discuss these perspectives, we need
to ask the following questions: why and how would we
want a machine to perform such a role? Sometimes,
we want a machine to act as a social catalyst simply
because there is no available human to perform that
role or when we want the social catalyst to act on a
nonhuman scale, simultaneously monitoring thousands
of conversations. In these cases, we may adopt a better
than nothing attitude. We program the machine to do
as decent as possible an imitation of the behavior of a
human social catalyst and accept that its performance
will be somewhere below human level.
In other cases, we may want a machine to act as a
social catalyst because the machine has decidedly
nonhuman ways to perform the role, which work better
than what humans might do. For example, the machine
may be expert at learning patterns that maintain coop-
eration between humans or expert at detecting pat-
terns that get humans stuck into suboptimal solutions,
and it may act on this knowledge in a way that humans
would not even consider—similar to the AlphaGomove
with nonhumanness that stupefied grandmaster Lee
Sedol (2).
As we will discuss shortly, these two approaches
come with their own sets of technical and ethical
challenges. However, the research by Traeger et al. (1)
suggests that a third and unexpected approach is
possible to using machines as social machines whose
social actions are not as smooth as humans, but yet
have more impact in changing human social behavior.
In their research, Traeger et al. (1) show that a robot
uttering “vulnerable” statements can promote engage-
ment within a human team both in absolute terms (total
speaking time increases) and in relative terms (speak-
ing time is more equally distributed). The subjective
experience of the team also improved and was rated as
more positive and fun. The vulnerable statements
made by the robot fell in three categories.
• Self-disclosure, such as the following: “Great job,
even though I sometimes doubt my abilities, I am
glad I contributed to our team success this round.”
Such disclosures can feel strange when the robot
mentions emotions or states of mind that it obvi-
ously cannot experience, such as doubt or happi-
ness. Think, for example, of how a human would
come across if they were to state these things in a
totally deadpan, nonemotional voice.
Fig. 1. Scales of modeling human and machine behavior.
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Author contributions: I.R., J.W.C., and J.-F.B. wrote the paper.
The authors declare no competing interest.
This open access article is distributed under Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives License 4.0 (CC BY-NC-ND).
See companion article, “Vulnerable robots positively shape human conversational dynamics in a human–robot team,” 10.1073/pnas.1910402117.
1To whom correspondence may be addressed. Email: rahwan@mpib-berlin.mpg.de, crandall@cs.byu.edu, or jean-francois.bonnefon@tse-fr.eu.
First published March 19, 2020.
































• Personal stories, such as “my soccer team went undefeated in
the 2014 season.” These stories are quite clearly made up,
which is interesting because sharing (obviously) fabricated an-
ecdotes would not be a great strategy for a human.
• Jokes, such as “why is the railroad angry? Because people are
always crossing it!” As the authors mention, this joke is meant
to be corny—in other words, the robot is intentionally pro-
grammed to make bad jokes or at least jokes that do not com-
pare favorably with the ones a funny human would make.
In sum, a striking aspect of the results of Traeger et al. (1) is that
the vulnerable robot is very successful at improving the conversa-
tional dynamics of the group, even though its techniques would
be found wanting if they were used by a human. In fact, what we
speculate is that the robot is successful because its techniques are
intentionally not as good as that a human would employ.
Imagine a human who would systematically try to tell bad jokes
and share fabricated personal anecdotes. This person would
probably be perceived as phony and trying too hard and would
make everyone uncomfortable. However, a robot doing the same
things gets different results. First, it is not making people too
uncomfortable because it is not a person whose face the group
has to save. Second, it intentionally sets a low bar for the
sophistication of one’s contribution to the conversation, which
may encourage the most self-conscious, shy humans to engage in
this conversation. This would help explain both the absolute and
relative effects observed in the experiment of Traeger et al. (1). If
the humans who would have refrained from speaking are now
encouraged to speak, human speaking time increases, and speak-
ing time is more equally distributed among humans.
Technical and Ethical Challenges
A robot that is a better social catalyst by being less socially suave
than a human offers new and fascinating perspectives. Consider
the technical and ethical challenges raised by robots that attempt
at being social catalysts by imitating human social behavior as
closely as possible. First, this strategy requires the robot to be
endowed with sophisticated abilities to navigate social contexts,
emotional states, and face-saving strategies and more generally,
to approximate the theory of mind-related reasoning that humans
are so very good at. Although social robotics is certainly making
strides in that direction, we know that this strategy comes with
formidable challenges (3): for example, overcoming the uncanny
valley (4). A robot that attempts to be a good social catalyst by
being intentionally less socially sophisticated than a human by-
passes at least some of these challenges.
Second, a robot with abilities and behavior that are designed
to make it as human like as possible raises specific ethical con-
cerns. As some ethicists argued, this humanizing strategy may
amount to unethical deception (5) and may muddle our percep-
tion of who is really accountable for the robot’s behavior (6).
Similarly, some privacy concerns may arise when social robots are
humanized to the extent that people form emotional bonds with
them. In particular, these emotional bonds may prompt humans to
interact in a more open or intimate way and can encourage them
to share sensitive information that they would have otherwise kept
private (7). In all of these cases, a robot with behavior that is a clear
reminder that it is not trying to display human-level social skills can
mitigate a variety of risks.
Consider now the technical and ethical challenges raised by
robots that try to be social catalysts by behaving in a nonhuman
way. First, they may succeed by using unconventional means at an
unconventional scale. For example, robots may have access to
vast amounts of data about us (beyond what would be required
by a human-like approach), enabling it to personalize interven-
tions to push people’s right buttons. This is not only a technical
challenge, but also a privacy challenge, echoing current debates
in the field of human resources analytics (8) and Surveillance
Capitalism more broadly (9). In other words, being nonhuman
may entail having dangerous (superhuman) influence capabilities.
Traeger et al. show that a robot uttering
“vulnerable” statements can promote
engagement within a human team both in
absolute terms (total speaking time increases)
and in relative terms (speaking time is more
equally distributed).
Second, the efficacy of this approach may require (when possible)
hiding the fact that a machine is acting as a social catalyst to avoid
defensive reactions from humans who may be concerned about
beingmanipulated by an opaque algorithm. This creates a tension
between the pursuit of performance and the ethical pursuit of
transparency and personal autonomy (10). Third, to seek social
catalyzation through uncharted, nonhuman means creates the risk
of adverse indirect effects, which are hard to anticipate precisely
because there might be little precedent for what the machine is
attempting.
Here too, programming a robot to use techniques that are
common to human social catalysts but intentionally not as smooth
may mitigate all of these risks. This strategy requires less sensitive
data when the robot performs its role (since it does not need a
subtle understanding of its teammates), it is by design transparent
(since it works precisely because it is performed by a robot rather
than a human), and using well-charted human techniques narrows
down the possibility of totally unexpected indirect effects.
Future Directions
There is much to be done in the wake of the research of Traeger
et al. (1). Indeed, our interpretation of their findings is entirely
speculative as are most of the perspectives we sketched in this
comment. An important step would be to identify other contexts
in which a robot, merely by being a robot, can put to good use
techniques that would not be optimal for a human social catalyst.
For example, there is research showing that a robot can helpfully
call out hostile or offensive behavior directed by a human team-
mate to another (11). This is a delicate role when performed by a
human because calling out the behavior of another can be per-
ceived as judgmental and increase tension and hostility as a result,
adversely affecting the social dynamics of the team. Accordingly,
it requires subtle attention to emotional shifts and a sophisticated
mastery of politeness protocols. It is fascinating to think that a
robot may be able to bluntly perform that role without the need
for subtle conversational moves precisely because a blunt call out
can emphasize that the robot is a nonjudgmental machine.
Another area of great potential is interaction with children.
Recent work showed that robots that interact with children as
peers could promote growth mindsets in children, thus facilitating
learning (12). Simple robots were also used in therapy for children
with Autism Spectrum Disorder (13). There is evidence that, when
interacting with such robots, the children directed more speech at
the robot than humans (14). Robots may offer a new role that






















facilitates all manners of learning and therapy in children precisely
because they are not human like and thus, may not evoke nega-
tive feelings, such as fear of competition or disappointment.
Even more broadly, humans increasingly interact with ma-
chines in an ecology that contains other humans and other ma-
chines (Fig. 1). This means that we might not only engineer
individual robots, but also machine collectives that are able to
influence humans (and each other) on vast scales. This raises many
questions about understanding the emergent behavior of these
machines and the emergent hybrid human–machine system (15).
The vulnerable robot of Traeger et al. (1), with its corny jokes and
bogus anecdotes, puts a friendly face on this social order; how-
ever, even that robot may face its own ethical issues: for example,
fairness. Inclusive and culturally sensitive social catalyzation ar-
guably requires greater social sophistication. If we intentionally
simplify the social capabilities of a machine for the purpose of
greater average performance, we may inadvertently reduce its
ability to recognize that different people may face different
challenges or have different expectations when contributing to a
team effort. This is not a criticism of the research of Traeger et al.
(1), who never suggested downgrading the social capabilities of
the robot teammate. It is merely a pointer for those who, like us,
believe that this research is opening fascinating perspectives
about when and why robots could paradoxically end up being
better social catalysts by doing things that would not work well
for humans.
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